2024年2月17日发(作者：)

外文文献翻译

(含：英文原文及中文译文)

文献出处： Yazan Damiri; The State of Executive Compensation[D];

University of Tennessee-Knoxville ; 5-2006

英文原文

The State of Executive Compensation

Yazan Damiri

University of Tennessee-Knoxville

Companies use different methods to compensate executives. An

ideal compensation package aligns executive incentives with shareholder

interests to minimize agency problems. These methods often include a

combination of: salary, bonus, stock options, stock grants, and pensions.

Since the use of stock options has recently been a subject of great

controversy, they will be discussed in greater detail since corporate

scandals such as Enron and WorldCom have been linked to stock option

grants (Hall-Murphy). However, the first component of compensation that

will be discussed is one that the average employee can relate to-salary.

Salary

Salary is a fixed amount of a compensation package and does not

vary in the short run (Balsam 35). However, salary can vary in the long

run depending on performance. Normally, companies include clauses in

compensation contracts allowing for raises that are contingent on

performance and duration. Since salary is the most risk-free component of

a compensation package it is very important in attracting executive talent,

especially if that individual is risk-averse (Balsam 312).

Bonus

A large portion of companies pay their executives a bonus based on

performance. A bonus is a form of compensation that is conditioned upon

the performance of one or more measures. According to Balsam's book,

"An Introduction to Executive Compensation," these measures can be

implicit or explicit, objective or subjective, or financial or non-financial.

Usually, the maximum bonus is expressed as a percentage of salary; as an

employee moves up in the corporate ladder, the percentage of salary that

can be earned as bonus usually increases (Balsam 314). It is not

uncommon for a CEO's bonus to be 100% of salary. In 2005, Wall Street

bonuses set a new record of $21.5 billion; the last record of $19.5 billion

was during the bull market of 2000 (). Wall Street bonuses

increased 15.5% over their levels in 2004 ().

Stock Options

Stock options allow the person who receives them to purchase stock

at a certain price usually over a certain period of time. Sometimes the

grantee has to wait until the vesting period is over before the options can

be exercised. A vesting period is a specified amount of time that the

grantee must wait before exercising the options. Typically, grants are

exercisable by allowing the grantee to exercise a certain percentage of the

entire grant over the vesting period. An example is allowing the executive

to exercise 25% of the grant in the first year of a four year vesting period

and the rest at the end of the period. The use of stock options increased

significantly during the 90's and has declined amid recent controversy

(Hall-Murphy). Options allowed companies to align their incentives with

those of managers and provided a form of compensation that did not

require an initial cash outlay. For many of the high tech startup firms of

the 90's this form of compensation seemed optimal. Stock options have

been the most controversial form of compensation due to several events

and misuses. The majority of Michael Eisner's compensation came in the

form of stock options, and some of the most prominent corporate scandals,

such as Enron and WorldCom, have been linked to the excessive use of

options (Hall-Murphy). One of the biggest issues surrounding the use of

options is how companies should account for them. The rules that govern

the accounting for stock options are established by the Financial

Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the Accounting Principles

Board (APB), which existed before FASB. The pronouncement that is

concerned with the expensing of stock options is APB Opinion 25, issued

in 1972, which states that the accounting charge for stock options is the

difference between the market price of the stock and the exercise price on

the date that the options are granted (Hall-Murphy). As a result there is no

charge for options that have an exercise price that is at or above market

price on the date the options are granted. However, in 1995 FASB

released FAS 123 which recommended that companies expense the fair

market value of options using an option pricing model, most prominently

the Black-Scholes model (Hall-Murphy). The pronouncement still

allowed companies to continue reporting options under APB Opinion 25,

however if they chose to do so they would also be required to disclose the

value of the option grant in a footnote to the financial statements. As late

as 2002, only a few companies were reporting stock options using FAS

123; although, amid corporate scandal in 2003 more than a 100

companies began to report using FAS 123 (Hall-Murphy). The reason that

so many companies choose not to expense the estimated fair market value

of the options is that it could significantly hurt their bottom line.

Furthermore, many startup companies use a tremendous amount of stock

options to attract talent to the firm because they do not have the resources

to pay high salaries or bonuses.

Stock Grants

Stock grants are shares of the company's stock that are given to

employees as compensation. They are valued at the market value of the

company's stock and have no exercise price (Balsam 38). Stock grants are

either classified as restricted or unrestricted; restricted grants cannot be

sold until the employee has been with the company for a certain amount

of time, whereas unrestricted shares can be sold at any time (Balsam 38).

The stock grants method of compensation is not as popular as stock

options because they are more expensive and they are not as effective in

aligning the interests of the executives with those of the company.

Pensions

A pension is a form of senior management who receives deferred

compensation after he/she retires from the company. After retirement,

executives receive payment or quantity. The amount may be based on a

pension plan or a cumulative amount of money that the executive may

have in a particular pension account. Therefore, pensions can be divided

into fixed benefit plans and fixed contribution plans. A fixed benefit plan

pays the employee based on a predetermined benefit formula, and the

employer contribution in the fixed contribution plan is defined as the plan

and the employee can give it an increase. Recently, the reduction of

employee pensions by major companies has become the focus of public

attention. As previously mentioned, Michael Eisner still receives an

annual pension of 297,779 US dollars from Disney (Plitch). However,

compared to paying $6518,459 a year to Pfizer chief executive officer

Henry McKinnell, this doesn't seem like a thing (The Corporate Library).

Recently, similar to Eisner, Mckinnell, the Pfizer shareholders have held a

"No Vote" campaign, supporting up to 22% of the board members of

Mckinnell's board members hiding their support (Masters). In addition to

normal pensions, companies have even established a special retirement

plan for key executives called the "Top Hat" plan to avoid tax

consequences (AFL-CIO).

trend

In 2005, the salaries and bonuses of senior executives rose by 7.1%,

following a 14.5% increase in 2004 and a 7.2% increase in 2003 (Wall

Street Journal/Mercer). An increase of more than 3.6% for executives'

increased wages and bonuses was paid to white-collar workers (Wall

Street Journal/Mercer). However, the increase in the median total pay for

executives,

Including wages, bonuses, and option exercise income, other

long-term incentive bonuses and value-recovery of restricted shares rose

by 15.8% from 2004 to US$6,049,504 (Wall Street Journal/Mercer). This

may seem like a big leap, but it is actually 40.9% more than the $5.9

million in 2004. It is actually quite modest (Wall Street Journal/Mercer).

In 2005, 192 executives exercised a median option income of 3,493,440

U.S. dollars. In 2004, 197 executives exercised a median option stock

option return of 3,229,072 U.S. dollars (Wall Street Journal/Mercer). The

expansion of inflation is not a valid reason, because it is clear that the rate

of increase in executive compensation has far outpaced the inflation rate,

creating an increasingly large salary gap between executives and

employees. Currently, a CEO pays 431 times the average worker's salary.

As executive compensation continues to grow, employee compensation

remains relatively stagnant, and this ratio continues to grow. This can be

directly observed from the increase in executive compensation and

employee compensation drawn in Figure 1.

The chart shows that employee compensation has been relatively

stable, and executive compensation has experienced significant growth.

By observing the relationship between the employee's salary CPI, in

recent years, the employee's salary has not even kept pace with inflation.

It can also be observed that executive compensation is directly

proportional to corporate profits, but not very drastic. This can be

attributed to the variable compensation components of executive

compensation packages such as bonuses, stock options and stock awards.

However, some experts question whether making variable compensation

such as stock options can really bring benefits to the company. Recent

research has found that there is a correlation (Norris) between using CEO

stock options and accounting for other financial statements. Proponents of

this view believe that stock options hold senior executives “false

accounts”. As we can see in Figure 1, the balance of executive

compensation has increased with the proportion of corporate profits, we

can draw a contrary view. This raises the question of who is responsible

for determining executive pay plans. Some people replied that they are

the executives who control the amount of compensation.

Another trend of executive compensation is corporate governance. A

company’s board of directors is responsible for compensating executives.

However, the problem is that in many cases the company’s CEO is

also the chairman. Earlier this issue appeared in the Eisner case. In fact,

the American Federation of Labor-Industrial Union estimates that in

two-thirds of the companies, the CEO is also the chairman (AFL-CIO).

This situation can lead to agency problems that make executives get

"economic rent." The economic rent is equivalent to a monopoly profit

owned by investors (Labour Union-CIO). This phenomenon triggers

agency costs and expenses for shareholders. However, the relevant laws

and regulations have recently been specifically formulated to safeguard

the interests of shareholders.

Trial Regulations

On January 17th, 2006, members of the Securities and Exchange

Commission put forward a bill that could cause a dramatic change in the

disclosure of executive compensation since 1992 (AP). The plan accepts a

60-day public comment period that will not take effect until the spring of

next year (AP). Under the new legislation, the company will be required

to provide its annual report and display the total annual remuneration of

the company's chairman, chief financial officer, and the highest-paying

executive in the next three years (AP). Its regulations stipulate that the

level of administrative benefits should be reduced from $50,000 to

$10,000, and that the retirement benefits of managers and remuneration

of board members must be disclosed in detail (AP). In addition,

non-independent pay committee members must disclose (). Finally,

the company will be asked to explain the goals behind executive

compensation. In the face of booming executive compensation, in order

to restore investor confidence, new regulations have been proposed.

Future executive compensation

Recent scandals and excessive abuse of company resources have

caused the public to strongly oppose high executive compensation.

However, we must first define what is the problem of over-exposure.

Executives take over the company’s power and make decisions that

determine the company’s lifeline. It seems sensible that a CEO who leads

a multinational company to get high pay because of his efforts. However,

there are three major problems in the current executive compensation

issues: performance, information disclosure, and corporate governance.

We should take some measures to evaluate the CEO's performance and

pay the CEO's compensation based on performance. These measures

should include long-term and short-term goals. This can prevent

executives from sacrificing the company's long-term interests to achieve

short-term financial goals in order to obtain incentive compensation. A

bad or mediocre CEO should not get paid more than his value. There is

no doubt that CEOs like Jack Welch who increase their shareholder's

wealth significantly outweigh the compensation they receive. Therefore, I

believe that the first question is whether or not the CEO pays a match

with what he gets compared to the growth of executive pay in general.

The view that the CEOs’ salary is too high is partly appropriate. It is

partly due to the company’s constant scandals and misuse of public trust

that leads to public resentment of the company. According to Figure 1, the

ratio of executive compensation increases with the increase in corporate

profits. increase. If the company's profits decline and executive

compensation increases, then it can well verify that executive

compensation is too high. Another major issue is the disclosure of

information, which is currently being handled by the US Securities

Regulatory Commission.

To ensure investor confidence, executive compensation must be

disclosed to the maximum extent, especially after the recent corporate

scandal. Stock options should be included in current profit or loss based

on their open market value. Obviously, they are valuable when they are

given value, otherwise they are not part of the compensation package.

Disclosure of executive benefits seems to be reasonable because

essentially the shareholders pay them, and shareholders have the right to

know. To ensure that the board of directors can focus on the interests of

the company, it must strengthen corporate governance issues.

The company’s CEO should not be allowed to be the chairman of the

board because it causes agency problems and leads to possible conflicts

of interest. According to current legislation, all remuneration committee

members are not independently disclosed (). However, this bill is

not enough. Senior executives should not be allowed to hold the position

of chairman of the board of directors. In the corporate governance

structure, there should be a system of checks and balances between the

separation of powers and the inspection of systems. Although issues such

as how corporate governance and agency issues will be handled are not

clear, one thing is clear and the public is no longer illusions about the

current system. In order to maintain public trust, major changes must be

made in the responsibilities and disclosures within the scope of executive

compensation.

中文译文

高管薪酬状况研究

雅赞·达米里

田纳西大学诺克斯维尔分校

公司使用不同的方案来补偿高管。一个理想的薪酬方案可以使高管激励与股东的利益相一致,尽量减少代理问题。这些方法通常包括工资,奖金,股票期权,股票奖励和养老金。由于安然公司和世通公司的丑闻与股票期权有关, 使得股票期权的使用问题变得非常有争议, 因此这一问题会被进一步细致的讨论。 然而, 第一部分将要讨论的报

酬是平均雇员薪金。

薪水

薪酬是固定金额的补偿方案，短期内不会变化（Balsam 35）。然而，工资的长期变化取决于绩效。通常情况下，公司在补偿合同中包含条款，允许提高绩效和持续时间。由于薪酬是薪酬组合中最无风险的组成部分，因此在吸引高管人才方面非常重要，特别是如果这个人是风险规避者（Balsam 312）。

奖金

很大一部分公司根据业绩向高管们支付奖金。奖金是一种以一种或多种措施的执行为条件的补偿形式。根据Balsam的书“高管薪酬简介”，这些措施可以是隐含的或明确的，客观的或主观的，或者是财务或非财务的。通常情况下，最高奖金表示为薪金的百分比;随着员工在公司阶梯上升，通常可以获得的奖金比例增加（Balsam 314）。

CEO的奖金是100％的薪水并不罕见。 2005年，华尔街奖金创下215亿美元的新纪录;最后一笔195亿美元的纪录是2000年的牛市（）。华尔街的奖金比2004年的水平（）增加了15.5％。

股票期权

股票期权允许接收他们的人以特定的价格通常在一段时间内购买股票。有时受让人必须等到行使期结束后才能行使选择权。归属期限是受权人在行使期权之前必须等待的特定时间。通常情况下，允许受让人在归属期内行使整个赠款的一定比例，即可行使赠款。一个例

子是允许执行人员在四年归属期的第一年执行25％的赠款，其余的在期末。在90年代期间，股票期权的使用大幅增加，并在最近的争议中下降（Hall-Murphy）。选择允许公司将他们的激励与管理者的激励相匹配，并提供了一种不需要最初现金支出的补偿形式。对于90年代的许多高科技初创公司来说，这种补偿形式似乎是最佳的。由于一些事件和误用，股票期权一直是最有争议的赔偿形式。大多数迈克尔艾斯纳的报酬都是以股票期权的形式出现的，一些最着名的公司丑闻，如安然和世通，与过度使用期权有关（霍尔 - 墨菲）。围绕使用期权的最大问题之一是公司应该如何解释它们。管理股票期权会计的规则由FASB之前的财务会计准则委员会（FASB）和会计准则委员会（APB）制定。关于股票期权费用的声明是在1972年发布的APB

Opinion 25，该声明指出，股票期权的会计费用是股票的市场价格与期权交割日的行权价格之间的差额（霍尔 - 墨菲）。因此，在授予期权时，行权价格等于或高于市场价格的期权不收费。然而，FASB在1995年发布了FAS 123，建议公司使用期权定价模型来支付期权的公平市场价格，最显着的是Black-Scholes模型（Hall-Murphy）。该声明仍然允许公司在APB第25号意见下继续报告期权，但是如果他们选择这样做，他们也将被要求在财务报表的脚注中披露期权授予的价值。直到2002年，只有少数公司使用FAS 123报告股票期权;尽管在2003年的公司丑闻中，超过100家公司开始使用FAS 123（Hall-Murphy）进行报告。如此多的公司选择不牺牲期权的估计公平市场价值的原因是，它可能会严重损害他们的底线。此外，许多创

业公司使用大量股票期权来吸引人才，因为他们没有资源支付高薪或奖金。

股票赠款

股票赠与是公司股票的股票，作为补偿给予员工。它们按公司股票的市场价值估价，并且没有行使价格（Balsam 38）。股票补助分为限制性或非限制性;受限制的赠款只有在员工在公司工作了一段时间才能出售，而无限制的股票可随时出售（Balsam 38）。股票补助的补偿方式并不像股票期权那样受欢迎，因为它们更昂贵。

养老金

养老金是高管人员在他 /她从公司退休之后仍收到递延酬劳的一种形式。在退休后高管人员收到付款或数量款项。 该金额可根据养老金计划或者是高管也许在一个特定的养老金账户的累计金额。

因此, 养老金可分为固定福利计划及固定供款计划。 固定福利计划是在预定效益公式的基础上向员工支付报酬, 而固定供款计划中的雇主贡献被定义为计划和员工可以会给它增加。 最近各大公司削减员工的养老金成为了公众 关注的焦点。正如前面提到的, Michael

Eisner仍然从迪斯尼(Plitch )得到每年支 付给他的 297779美元养老金。然而,相比每年支付 6518459美元给辉瑞公司首席执 行官 Henry

McKinnell,这似乎算不上什么(The Corporate Library) 。 最近,类似以

Eisner , Mckinnell 为目标由辉瑞股东们举行了“投反对票”活动,支持

Mckinnell 的董事会成员中有高达 22%的股东隐藏了他们的支持

(Masters)。 除了正常的养老金, 企业甚至已经为主要的高管人员建立

了专门的退休计划,被称为“ Top Hat ”计划,以避免税务后果(AFL-CIO) 。

趋势

2005年,高层管理人员的工资和奖金上涨 7.1%,继 2004年上涨

14.5%与 2003年上涨 7.2%之后 (《华尔街日报》 / Mercer)。对于高管增加的工资及奖金有超过 3.6%的增长是支付给了白领 (《华尔街日报》 /Mercer)。然而,高管总薪酬中位数的增加,

其中包括工资、 奖金、 期权行权收益, 其他长期激励奖金和限售股的价值收益从2004 年上涨了 15.8%到 6,049,504美元 《华尔街(日报》 / Mercer)。这看起来似乎是大幅跳, 然而相比到 2004年的 590万美元增长 40.9%, 它实际上是非常温和的 (《 华尔街日报》 /

Mercer) 。 2005年, 192个高管行使股票期权中位数收益 3493440美元,在 2004年 197名高管行使股票期权中位数收益为 3229072美元

(《华尔街日报》 / Mercer)。通货 膨胀不是一个有效的理由, 因为很明显, 高管薪酬的大幅增加的速度远远超过通货膨 胀率,形成了越来越大的高管和员工的薪酬差距。目前,一个 CEO 报酬相当于平均 工人工资的 431倍。 随着高管薪酬持续增长, 员工薪酬保持相对停滞,

这一比率继续 变大。这可以从图 1绘制的高管薪酬与员工薪酬的增长直接观测到。

图表显示, 员工薪酬已经相对稳定, 而高管薪酬已经经历了显著的增长。 通过观察员工工资 CPI 的关系, 在最近几年, 员工薪酬甚至尚未跟上通货膨胀的速度。 也可以观察到, 高管薪酬与企业利润

成正比, 但不是非常剧烈。 这可以归因于高管薪酬组 合的变量报酬部分如奖金、 股票期权和股票奖励。 然而, 一些专家质疑使可变薪酬如 股票期权是否真的能给公司带来利益。最近的研究发现使用

CEO 股票期权和会计还 有其他财务报表之间存在相关性 (诺里斯 ) 。这种观点的支持者认为,股票期权怂恿高 管人员“做假帐” 。正如在图 1中看到的高管薪酬均衡的随着企业利润的比例上升, 我们可以得出一个相反的观点。这就引发了一个问题——谁负责确定高管薪酬方案。 有些人回答说是控制补偿数量的高管自己。

高管薪酬的另一个趋势是公司治理的问题。 一个公司的董事会负责补偿高管。

然而问题是, 在许多情况下公司的 CEO 也是董事长。 在早些时候这个问题出现了在 艾斯纳案例中。 事实上,美国劳工联合会 -产业工会联合会估计,在三分之二的公司 中, CEO 同时也是董事长

(劳联 -产联 ) 。这种情况会导致代理问题,使得高管可以得 到 “经济租金” 。 经济租金相当于从投资者那里占有的一种垄断利润 (劳联 -产联 ) 。 这种现象对股东来说引发了代理成本与费用。 然而,

最近为维护股东利益用专门拟定了 相关法规。

试行条例

2006年 1月 17日证券交易委员会委员们提出了一项议案, 该议案有可能会使自 1992年以来高管薪酬的披露问题发生极大的改变(美联社) 。该计划接受 60天的公众评议期,最早在明年春天才能生效(美联社) 。在新法例下,公司将被要求提供 其年度报表并显示该公司

董事长、 财务总监及未来三年最高薪行政人员的年度报酬总 额(美联社) 。新法例的其条例规定:行政津贴水平从 $ 50,000降低至

$ 10,000,管理 人员的退休福利和董事会成员的薪酬的披露必须详细(美联社) 。此外,非独立的薪 酬委员会成员必须予以披露( ) 。最后,公司将被要求解释高管薪酬背后 的目标。面对蓬勃发展的高管薪酬,以恢复投资者的信心,新的规定已经提出。 未来的高管薪酬

最近的丑闻和过度滥用公司资源造成了公众对过高高管薪酬的强烈反对。然而, 首先要对什么是过度这个问题进行定义。 高管们执掌公司大权, 做出决定公司命脉的决策。一个 CEO 领导一个跨国公司因为他的努力而得到高额的薪酬似乎是很有道理 的。但是目前的高管薪酬问题中主要存在三个问题:绩效、信息披露和公司治理。我 们应该采取一定的措施来评估 CEO 的绩效, 根据绩效来支付

CEO 的报酬。 这些措施 应该包括长期和短期目标。 这可以防止高管为了获得激励薪酬而去牺牲公司的长远利 益以达到短期财务目标。一个不良的或平庸的 CEO 不应该得到超过他价值的报酬。 没有会质疑像 Jack Welch这样增加股东财富显著超过他所收到的报酬的 CEO 。 因此, 我相信首要的问题是相对于一般高管薪酬的增长,

CEO 付出的是否与他得到的相匹配。 CEO 们的薪酬太高这一观点部分是适当的,部分是由于企业不断的丑闻和滥用 公众信任从而导致公众对企业充满怨恨而造成的根据图 1, 高管薪酬比例随着公司利 润的增长而增长。 如果公司利润下降而高管薪酬增加, 那么就能很好的验证高管薪酬 过高。另一个主要的问题就是信息的披露,目前

美国证监会正在处理。

为确保投资者的信心, 高管薪酬要以最大程度披露, 特别是在发生了最近的公司丑闻之后。 股票期权应根据它们的公开市场价值计入当期损益。很显然,当被赋予 价值时它们才会有价值, 否则, 它们便不属于薪酬组合的一部分。 高管福利的披露似 乎是合理的 , 因为本质上是股东支付给他们的,股东有权知道。为确保董事会能够着力于公司利益,必须加强公司治理问题 。

公司的 CEO 不应该被允许作为董事会主席,因为这会引起了代理问题,并导致 可能的利益冲突。根据现行法例规定,所有薪酬委员会的成员不是独立披露的 ( )。然而,这个法案是远远不够的。高管人员不应该被允许持有董事会主席 的位置。 在公司治理结构中应该有一个有权责的分立和系统的检查的制衡制度。 虽然像公司治理和代理问题将如何处理等问题并不明确, 但有一件事是清楚的, 公众已经不再对当前的制度抱有幻想。 为了维持公众的信任, 必须在高管薪酬范围内的责任和 披露作重大改变。