2024年3月16日发(作者：windows10下载工具太慢了)

外文翻译---总裁股权激励的投资者定价

Investor pricing of CEO equity incentives

Jeff P. Boone Inder K. Khurana K. K. Raman

Abstract

The main purpose of this paper is to explore CEO compensation in the

form of stock and objective of CEO compensation is to better

align CEO-shareholder interests by inducing CEOs to make more optimal

(albeit risky) investment decisions. However, recent research suggests

that these incentives have a significant down-side (i.e., they motivate

executives to manipulate reported earnings and lower information

quality). Given the conflict between the positive CEO-shareholder

incentive alignment effect and the dysfunctional information quality

effect, it is an open empirical question whether CEO equity incentives

increase firm value. We examine whether CEO equity incentives are priced

in the firm-specific ex ante equity risk premium over the 1992–2007

time period. Our analysis controls for

two potential structural changes over this time period. The first is

the 1995 Delaware Supreme Court ruling which increased protection from

takeovers (and decreased risk) for Delaware incorporated firms. The

second is the 2002 Sarbanes–Oxley Act which

impacted corporate risk taking, equity incentives, and earnings

management. Collectively, our findings suggest that CEO equity

incentives, despite being associated with lower information quality,

increase firm value through a cost of equity capital channel.

Keywords:CEO equity incentives，Information quality，Cost of equity

capital

Introduction

In this study, we investigate investor pricing of CEO equity

incentives for a large sample of US firms over the period 1992–

e incentives embedded in CEO

compensation contracts may be expected to influence policy choices

at the firm level, our objective is to examine whether CEO equity

incentives influence firm value through a cost of equity capital channel.

Prior research (e.g., Jensen et al. 2004; Jensen and Murphy 1990)

suggests that equity- based compensation, i.e., CEO compensation in the

form of stock and options,

provides the CEO a powerful inducement to take actions to increase

shareholder value (by investing in more risky but positive net present

value projects). Put differently, equity incentives are expected to help

mitigate agency costs by aligning the interests of the CEO with those of

the shareholders, and otherwise help communicate to investors the

important idea that the firm’s objective is to maximize shareholder

wealth (Hall and

Murphy 2003).

However, recent research contends that equity incentives also have a

perverse or dysfunctional downside. In particular, equity-based