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Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers

Author(s): Gary S. Becker and George J. Stigler

Source:

The Journal of Legal Studies,

Vol. 3, No. 1 (Jan., 1974), pp. 1-18

Published by: The University of Chicago Press

Stable URL: /stable/724119

Accessed: 18/11/2010 00:18

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Journal of Legal Studies.

AND

LAW

ENFORCEMENT, MALFEASANCE,

OF ENFORCERS

COMPENSATION

GARY S. BECKER* and GEORGE

J. STIGLER**

THE

new economic

approach

to

political

behavior seeks to

develop

a

positive theory

of

legislation,

in

contrast

to the normative

approach

of

welfare economics. The new

approach

asks

why

certain industries and not

others become

regulated

or have tariffs

imposed

on

imports

or

why

income

transfers take the form and direction

they do,

in contrast to

asking

which

industries should be

regulated

or have tariffs

imposed,

or what transfers

should be made.

Both the normative and

positive approaches

to

legislation, however,

of laws for

granted,

and have not included

generally

have taken enforcement

systematic analyses

of the cost of

enforcing

different kinds of laws. In

separate

studies1

we

recently

formulated rules

designed

to increase the

effectiveness of different laws. We

proposed

that offenders convicted of

violating

laws be

punished

by

an amount related to the value of the

damages

caused to

others, adjusted upwards

for the

probability

that offenders avoid

conviction.

In and of

itself,

this rule

says nothing

about

appropriations

for

enforcing

laws,

or the

diligence

and

honesty

of enforcers. We did discuss

optimal

enforcement

through

the introduction

of enforcement

cost

functions,

but did

not seek to

explore

the detailed content of

these functions. The

purpose

of

the

present essay

is to

inquire

more

closely

into the enforcement

problem.

Part I discusses the

general

circumstances that influence the

vigor

of

enforcement and the

frequency

of violations. Part II

considers the conse-

quences

of weak enforcement

for the

operation

of the

legal system.

Part III

makes two

suggestions

for

improving

the incentives

given

enforcers. Both

*

University

Professor of

Economics, University

of

Chicago.

**

Charles R.

Walgreen Distinguished

Service Professor of

American

Institutions,

Department

of Economics and

Graduate School of

Business, University

of

Chicago.

Our research has been

supported by

a

grant

from the National

Science Foundation to

the National Bureau of Economic

Research.

This

paper

is not an official Bureau

publica-

tion, however,

since it has not

yet undergone

the full critical

review accorded National

Bureau

publications, including approval by

the Bureau's board of directors.

1

See Gary

S.

Becker,

Crime and Punishment: An

Economic

Approach,

76

J.

Pol.

Econ. 169

(1968);

George J. Stigler,

The

Optimum Enforcement

of

Laws,

78

J.

Pol.

Econ. 526

(1970).

1